Don’t I Know You?
The Effect of Prior
Acquaintance/Familiarity
On Witness Identification

t is now conventional wisdom that eyewitness identifications can be notoriously unreliable.1 But what
about identifications by witnesses who believe the
perpetrator is someone familiar? Are their identifications reliable?

I

A. An Exemplar Case:
State v. Guilbert
In 2007, a jury convicted Brady Guilbert of shooting three men in New London, Conn., two of them
fatally.2 The prosecution alleged that Guilbert shot one
man in a bar at around 1:00 a.m. on Oct. 9, 2004, and,
then, a few blocks away and five minutes later, shot two
others in the head while they sat in the front seat of a
parked car. Guilbert was convicted almost entirely on
the testimony of four alleged eyewitnesses. At trial,
Guilbert challenged the reliability of all of the eyewitness identifications.

One witness was the man who was shot in the dimly
lit bar. He initially said he did not know who shot him,
later said it was Guilbert, with whom he had a previous
altercation, and still later denied making any identification at all. The second witness emerged from the bar
restroom after the shooting and saw the shooter only
briefly. That witness came forward 10 days later, after
seeing a newspaper article about the shooting that
included Guilbert’s photograph.
The two other witnesses — both of whom identified Guilbert as the assailant in the car shooting — also
did not come forward until after reading the news story
with Guilbert’s photograph. Both of these witnesses
were also cousins of one of the victims and claimed they
were acquainted with Guilbert. One said Guilbert lived
with her family when she was younger, and the other
said Guilbert had been a regular customer at Dunkin’
Donuts when she worked there months earlier.3
Guilbert’s lawyers unsuccessfully attempted to call
an expert witness to testify about factors that might
affect the reliability of eyewitness identifications. In disallowing the expert testimony, the court reasoned that
the reliability of eyewitness identifications — including
the effect of a witness’s prior familiarity with the alleged
perpetrator — was within the “common knowledge” of
the members of the jury, which made expert testimony
unnecessary.4
This article refutes the “common knowledge”
approach. Absent expert guidance, jurors will likely be
misled by their commonly held — but incorrect —
beliefs and assumptions. Indeed, the Guilbert court’s
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core reasoning in denying the request
for expert testimony — that any concerns about the reliability of eyewitness
identifications are eliminated when an
eyewitness is “familiar” with the identified person — is a stunning example of
a commonly held but incorrect assumption. Scientifically-designed research
studies have consistently shown that
prior familiarity can adversely affect the
reliability of an eyewitness identification in nuanced, complex, and often
counterintuitive ways. In short, familiarity does not guarantee reliability.

B. Familiarity and
Facial Recognition

1. Factors That Interact With
Familiarity to Produce
Counterintuitive Results
The most obvious and relevant difference between stranger and nonstranger identifications is pre-event
exposure time: previous interaction
with a person is a prerequisite for familiarity, or “non-stranger identifications,”
but a negating condition for identification of strangers (i.e., if one had a previous interaction with someone, that person is “familiar” and no longer a
W W W. N A C D L . O R G

exposure equipped them to make an
identification; as a result, they more frequently chose a photograph from the
lineup. Unfortunately, they were mistaken about the effect of their prior
exposure to the subject. Although longinteraction clerks were able to report a
greater aggregate quantity of information about the target, the absolute quantity of correct information was the same
for both long- and short-interaction
clerks. Simply put, increased interaction
time causes people to think they
remember more about a familiar person’s physical appearance than they
actually do. That assumption more
often leads them to conclude erroneously that a stranger who looks familiar is, in fact, the familiar person.
Whereas increased interaction time
increases false-positive identifications
by altering self-perception, context
increases false positives through unconscious, associative distortions. In particular, subconscious expectations and the
presentation of contextual information
— such as information about the person’s background, personality, or the
circumstances in which the person is
typically encountered — serve as “priming” mechanisms that increase the identifier’s confidence to make an identification and the probability that the identification will be wrong.15
This context effect is due largely to
the unique cognitive processes that
underlie how one recognizes familiar
faces. Neuroscientific findings suggest
that the successful recognition of familiar faces involves not only visual familiarity, but also emotional responses and
“person knowledge” stored in long-term
memory (e.g., personal traits, biographic information, and episodic memories
associated with the individual).16
Consequently, problems with any one of
these streams can negatively impact
familiar face recognition. Moreover, the
intermingling of processing streams
sometimes allows increased input from
one stream to hijack the other streams,
producing unexpected results.
The “availability heuristic” (cognitive reliance on a rule-of-thumb to
make judgments) is an example of such
hijacking. The availability heuristic
causes people to assume that there is a
direct relationship between how they
think about an event and how the event
likely occurred; the brain uses
“strength of association as a basis for
the judgment of frequency” without
assessing actual probability. 17 For
example, one may judge the likelihood
that a particular suspect is guilty of a
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The recognition and identification
of familiar faces has been the focus of a
number of scholarly studies in the fields
of psychology and neuroscience.5 As a
general matter, the accuracy of facial
recognition and identification increases
as a function of familiarity: ceteris
paribus, people can recognize their own
faces better than those of celebrities, the
faces of celebrities better than those of
acquaintances, and those of acquaintances better than those of strangers.6
Within this general framework, however, empirical findings have painted an
unexpectedly intricate and less straightforward picture.
Research shows that, counterintuitively, identifications of familiar faces
— as with identifications of unfamiliar
faces — are influenced by a host of variables, including interaction time, contextual information, expectation, postevent information, and own-race bias.
By changing how the brain perceives
and processes interactions, these variables simultaneously increase the probability that an individual will identify a
given face as familiar and inflate the
individual’s confidence in the identification, regardless of whether the face in
fact is familiar or the identification
accurate.

stranger). As a matter of common sense,
the more time spent interacting with a
person, the more thoroughly the unique
physical characteristics of that person
should be encoded, thus producing
more accurate recognition and identification. To a degree, this intuitive
assumption is confirmed by science:
increased interaction time does seem to
produce marginally more accurate identifications.7
However, a larger and more counterintuitive result also stems from
increased interaction time: a greater
incidence of false positives — that is, a
propensity of the witness to incorrectly
select strangers’ photographs from lineups, whether or not the lineup contains
the familiar person’s photograph.8 This
counterintuitive relationship was most
clearly demonstrated in a 1995 experiment that examined the effect of
increased interaction time on store
clerks’ ability to accurately recognize
and identify a female target.9 Half of the
clerks spoke with the female target for
30-60 seconds (“short-interaction”
clerks); the other half were interviewed
by the female target for between four
and 12 minutes (“long-interaction”
clerks). Two days later, all clerks were
asked to pick out the targets’ photographs in various photographic lineups;
some lineups contained the targets’
photos (target-present), while others
did not (target-absent).10
On the whole, the most reliable
effect of increased exposure to the
female target was the clerks’ greater willingness to identify someone from the
lineups, but their choices were wholly
unrelated to increased ability to choose
the correct photograph.11 For both target-present and target-absent lineups,
the long-interaction clerks more often
erroneously picked the photograph of a
stranger as the interviewer. Moreover,
the long-interaction clerks’ performance deteriorated most severely — and
most disturbingly for eyewitness identification purposes — in target-absent
lineups: the percentage of clerks who
incorrectly said the target was present
more than doubled as their interaction
time with the female target increased.12
This increase in misidentifications was
“entirely attributable” to the clerks’
increased propensity to select a
stranger’s photograph.13
The unexpected results of this
study are explained by the effect of
increased exposure on the clerks’ selfperception.14 The clerks who had interacted with the target for a longer period
of time were more confident that the
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crime by scanning one’s own mind for
similar instances or associations, as a
shortcut for assessing the actual circumstances surrounding the crime.
The availability heuristic has been welldocumented in other recall-based
tasks.18 As applied to facial recognition,
the availability heuristic predicts that
“enhanced contextual information
increase[s] the ease of recall of information about the target … and that
this familiarity [i]s misattributed to
perceptual familiarity.”19 Expectation
similarly “raises the basic activation
level of the face recognition unit” of
the brain to enhance the ease of recall
and produce the same misattribution
effect. 20 Thus, because information
about a familiar individual’s identity is
already stored in an identifier’s brain,
both contextual information and
expectations triggered by surroundings
or circumstances associated with the
familiar person “prime” the identifier’s
brain to more likely misidentify a
stranger as the familiar person.

2. Irrespective of
Familiarity, Other Factors
Also Significantly Affect
The Reliability of
Eyewitness Identification
Although there are unique cognitive processes that affect familiar eyewitness identifications, there also are
some cognitive processes implicated in
all facial recognition, regardless of
familiarity.21 Both mundane and less
obvious factors have been shown unexpectedly to affect the accuracy of all
eyewitness identifications. These
include situational factors, the typicality effect, own-race bias, and the inaccuracy of eyewitness confidence. The
effects of post-event contextual information discussed below can also apply
to the identification of strangers and
non-strangers alike.22
For commonplace situational factors like poor viewing conditions and
facial typicality, what is surprising is the
magnitude of the deleterious effects. In
one study, bad lighting and partially
concealing the subject’s face and hair
reduced correct identifications of
known subjects by 18 percent.23
The “typicality effect” makes individuals more likely to misidentify a typical but unfamiliar face as familiar than
to misidentify an atypical familiar
face.24 This occurs because “increased
typicality is associated with increased
general familiarity and decreased memW W W. N A C D L . O R G

orability.”25 Moreover, “familiarity arising from some specific prior exposure
is not intrinsically separable from the
structurally induced familiarity that
arises from a lifetime of experience
with similar exemplars.”26
Less obvious phenomena — e.g.,
the own-race bias (ORB) effect (i.e.,
more accurate identifications of people
among a witness’s own race) — may
also affect both familiar and unfamiliar
face recognition. The ORB effect is
resilient and pronounced. It occurs
across memory tasks (e.g., face recognition, face matching, and lineup identifications), is resistant to time and familiarity manipulations, and is replicable
in a wide variety of experimental settings.27 In a meta-analysis of 91 studies
reported in 39 research articles, ORB
was found consistently to decrease correct identifications and increase falsepositive identifications.28
Finally, it is now well-established
that eyewitness confidence (i.e., in the
accuracy of their own identification) is
an unreliable predictor of actual accuracy across the board.29 This kind of
confidence is different than the confidence (discussed above) that the witness will be able to make an identification at all, but similarly creates potential for error in identifications and subsequent prosecutions of suspects.

Conclusion
Empirical evidence and an array of
DNA exonerations have confirmed that
familiarity does not eliminate misidentification problems. Even with familiar
faces, people are significantly worse at
recognizing faces than they expect.
Given this fact, some courts recognize
the importance of cautionary expert
testimony concerning the reliability of
eyewitnesses.30 But, when “familiarity”
is involved in an identification, courts
often fail to allow expert testimony,
instead clinging to the belief that eyewitness testimony “is particularly valuable where … lay witnesses are able to
make the challenged identifications
based on their familiarity with characteristics of the defendant. …”31
Tragically, this erroneous presumption
has significantly contributed to wrongful convictions.32
Among DNA exoneration cases in
which erroneous eyewitness identifications were implicated, several involved
misidentifications by witnesses, other
than accomplices, who were familiar or
acquainted with the suspect.33 In the
case of Mark Diaz Bravo, for example,

the rape victim, a manic-depressive disorder patient in a Los Angeles psychiatric hospital where Bravo worked as a
nurse, identified him by name as the
assailant and later identified him in
court.34 In addition to the eyewitness
identification, Bravo previously had falsified his qualifications on applications
and business cards, and had a rare
blood type that matched blood found
on the blanket where the rape occurred.
After three years in prison, however,
DNA testing on semen from the rape
exonerated Bravo.
Similarly, in Alexandria, Va., a jury
convicted Walter Snyder for rape and
sodomy on the basis of an identification by the victim, who lived across the
street from Snyder.35 The victim identified Snyder in a police station “showup.” In addition, both Snyder and the
perpetrator were type A secretors.
Moreover, Snyder’s alibi was corroborated only by his mother. But after DNA
testing of semen found on a vaginal
swab from the original rape kit excluded Snyder, the governor of Virginia
granted Snyder an absolute pardon and
he was released from prison after serving seven years of his original sentence.
These and other cases apparently
involved honest mistakes by eyewitnesses whose identifications jurors
understandably might have assumed
were reliable. As this article shows,
however, such assumption may be misplaced.36 Consequently, courts should
recognize this danger and permit expert
testimony to assist the jury in properly
assessing the reliability of all eyewitness
evidence, regardless of whether the witness claimed the suspect was familiar.
The authors are greatly appreciative
of the valuable assistance of Julianna
Soic, a member of the 2012 Duke Law
School class, who helped with an earlier
related work.

Notes
1. Neil Vidmar et al., Lying Eyes:
Rethinking Reliance on Eyewitness
Confidence, 94:1 JUDICATURE 16 (July-Aug.
2010). The Supreme Court this Term rejected a due process challenge to the failure
of a trial court to conduct a preliminary
judicial inquiry into the reliability of an
eyewitness identification made under
unnecessarily suggestive circumstances,
but without manipulation by the police.
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